After proving that this was a pre-arranged tender, after confirming that the company Excelerate Global Operations LLC did not own these assets when it entered the competition, when it was declared the winner, or even when it signed the contract with KESH sh.a., despite this being a key criterion, and after revealing the financial transactions made to operate two ships that had been unused since 2018 due to outdated technology and a cost 160% higher than the market price for electricity production, we now expose another major scandal within the Tiger 1 and Tiger 3 affair. This scandal was originally reported by journalist Habion Hasani for Hashtag.al.

While the floating thermal power plants (TPPs) remained anchored off the coast of Vlora for three years without ever being operational, accumulating millions of euros in costs, KESH continued new procedures related to this project, deepening the financial losses. On August 7, 2024, KESH publicly announced a procurement procedure for purchasing 21,000 tons of HFO fuel for the floating power plants in Vlora. The deadline for submitting offers was August 27, 2024, while the contract and guarantees were to be finalized by September 28, 2024, with fuel delivery no later than October 28, 2024. According to KESH's technical specifications, the contract was set to last until November 5, 2024, with product delivery required within 30 days of KESH issuing a Letter of Credit (LC) for payment. There are strong suspicions that this $11 million contract did not comply with public procurement regulations or the required deadlines. The ship that transported the HFO fuel, named HOPE A, flying the Maltese flag, anchored in Valletta on October 28, 2024, and arrived in Albania on November 2, 2024, at 11:00 PM.

According to a customs declaration dated November 3, 2024, the exporter was EMAD Energy SA-1207 Geneva (CH), while the recipient was KESH sh.a.. The declaration further confirms that: The origin of the product was Algeria, while the exporting country was Malta. The total quantity was 21,412.5 metric tons, and the payment value was $515.25 per metric ton, totaling approximately $11 million. EMAD Energy SA is registered in Switzerland but not in Albania. The company does not hold License A, as required by Article 19 of Law 8450, which regulates the processing, transport, and trade of oil, gas, and their derivatives. 

Neither KESH nor the trading company hold this License A, as mandated by Article 10, Section III, Letter Ç, and Article 14, which apply to wholesale trading companies.

The importation of fuel into Albania requires approval from Customs and ISHTI, and any imported oil or fuel derivative brought into the country without proper licensing is considered contraband.

Moreover, ISHTI must conduct sample testing to certify compliance with technical standards under Order No. 6, dated January 9, 2015, as per Law 8450.

The acceptance of HFO products from the company EMAD Energy SA through extralegal procedures for the Thermal Generation Project raises suspicions not only of corruption but also of threats to national security and indirect financing of hostile structures against Albania. The exporting company, EMAD Energy SA, is linked to "ASB Group of Companies in Turkey." The owner of ASB Group has been convicted of federal crimes related to terrorism against the United States of America. In this case, the corrupt connections appear to extend even further, involving darker interests, namely, the financing of Iran's Revolutionary Guard, a fact that has been previously exposed.

Leaked emails from Iran-Leaks suggest that in 2021, the administrator of EMAD Group SA communicated with a manager from ASB Group regarding a shipment of 3,400 tons of fuel to Albania, with prices determined by Sonatrach, Algeria's state-owned oil company. A deeper analysis of Iranian-Leaks documents reveals even stronger connections between ASB Group and Albania.

In 2020, the sanctioned Turkish ASB Group executed a $36 million sale of Iranian oil, using Albania as a transit hub. Moreover, in Albania, a Turkish-owned company, MAC General Trading shpk, is also registered, further reinforcing suspicions about the extent of these illicit operations.

According to data from the Iran-Leaks, it has been revealed that a representative of this company, named Murat Halli, was communicating via email with Kazim Oztaz, a representative of ASB Group in Turkey, regarding the trade of fuel worth €36 million through Albania.

Three years later, Kazim Oztaz was convicted by a U.S. court for violating the oil embargo and was sanctioned.

Emails from Iran-Leaks also disclosed that the tax invoice of the Albanian company MAC General Trading shpk was issued through a subsidiary of ASB Group. However, a confidential contract, uncovered in the leaked emails, suggests that the Albanian company had actually purchased the fuel directly from Iran through a direct agreement with the Iranian company "Madolia Group."

This indicates that in 2020, Albania served as a base for operations involving the smuggling of Iranian oil and the circumvention of embargoes and sanctions.

ASB Group, the sanctioned Turkish entity, is owned by Sitki Ayan, who is a business partner in at least 12 joint ventures with Iran's military guard, which controls the country's oil sales.

Sitki Ayan is not just a Turkish businessman dealing with Iranians; he is a close associate of President Erdoğan and is considered one of his trusted confidants.

This was not the first instance of oil procurement. In February 2024, another procurement was made, with Firden Kuqi as the winning bidder, securing €3 million in funds. The next operation under investigation took place in September, involving companies that were not licensed for such services. This suggests that 4,000 tons of fuel were purchased to operate Tiger 1 and Tiger 3, but the vessels were never put into operation. The importers were aware that a licensed company was required to carry out these transactions, yet they used another company to smuggle 21,000 tons of oil, which was later proven to be linked to Iran's Revolutionary Guard.

The involvement of compromised Turkish companies working with Albanian state-owned entities like KESH, or using Albania as an operational hub for sanction evasion, stems from the close relationship between Prime Minister Rama and President Erdoğan.

Recently, former Pentagon official Michael Rubin claimed in an analysis that former U.S. ambassador Yuri Kim tolerated this relationship between Rama and Erdoğan due to her declared ambition to become the U.S. ambassador to Turkey. Her role in this multimillion-euro affair was not just a suspicion raised by journalists and foreign officials but was confirmed by Belinda Balluku and Yuri Kim herself, who spoke on behalf of the U.S. regarding a corrupt operation in which the U.S. had no involvement.

Now, turning to the costs and financial tracking, where do the millions spent on maintaining these floating power plants go? According to technical data, these vessels require 25,000 tons of HFO per month. Simply put, KESH's latest tender for purchasing 21,000 tons of oil for €11 million represents a monthly cost that will be covered by taxpayers, generating electricity at a price 160% higher than the market rate.

As part of the Thermal Generation Asset Project in Vlorë, an assessment of the minimum fixed costs over one year reveals that KESH has spent €40 million so far without producing a single megawatt of energy. At this stage of the investigation, it is clear that we are dealing with a blatant case of corruption. Plug continued its investigation to shed light on the beneficiaries of this scheme. To do so, we analyzed the data of the company registered in Albania for the implementation of the contract signed with KESH sha. In June 2022, the company Excelerate-Renco FPB was registered with QKB, with 90% ownership held by Excelerate Albania Holding shpk and Renco S.p.a.  In August 2022, the Assembly of Partners decided to increase the company's capital based on an agreement between the parties: "The partners approved a capital increase of $4,322,563." In December 2022, new decisions were filed with QKB, with the Assembly approving another capital increase: "The partners approved a capital increase of $23,128,455." This increase was made through cash deposits from both companies, in proportion to their shares. Additionally, the partners filed another decision from October 2022, approving the payment of Invoice No. 2 for engineering services contracted with Renco S.p.a. in the amount of $3.9 million. In March 2023, a new decision from January 2023 was filed with QKB, authorizing the payment of Invoices No. 11 and 12 to Renco S.p.a. for $1.5 million for engineering services.

Since August, when the company managing the contract with KESH was registered, 12 invoices have been issued by the partner Renco S.p.a. under the Engineering, Procurement, and Construction (EPC) contract.

In March 2023, the Assembly of Partners approved the payment of Invoices No. 25-26, amounting to $1.5 million for the same contract with Renco S.p.a.. All payments made from Excelerate-Renco FPB to its partner Renco S.p.a. for engineering and construction work on the Tiger vessels were simultaneously recorded as capital increases.

By March 2023, a total of 26 invoices had been paid, reaching an estimated value of $20 million, a highly suspicious transaction, as the vessels have neither been put into operation nor moved from their docking location. In May 2023, the company submitted a formal letter to QKB, notifying that it had fully settled its capital increase, amounting to 2.6 billion lekë (over $26 million), most of which, as previously explained, was paid to Renco S.p.a.

By February 2025, the company had only reported these Assembly decisions, stating that the total share value now exceeds $50 million, all of which consists of capital injections from its partners to pay Renco S.p.a. Despite this significant capital increase, the company has not declared any financial statements. To gain further insights, we analyzed the main partner, Excelerate Albania Holding. This company is wholly owned by Excelerate Energy Limited Partnership, not by Excelerate Global Operations LLC, which is the entity that actually signed the contract with KESH sha.

This raises serious legal concerns, as these two companies, despite possibly having the same shareholder, are legally distinct entities. According to the tender documentation, the vessels were owned by Excelerate Global Operations LLC, and the contract was signed with them. However, the company established in Albania to manage this contract with KESH was founded by Excelerate Energy Limited Partnership.

Official records reveal that Excelerate Energy Limited Partnership, which founded Excelerate Albania Holding, which in turn founded Excelerate-Renco FPB, the company ultimately benefiting from Albanian taxpayer money, has a 10% shareholder whose identity remains undisclosed.

To put it simply, Albanian taxpayers will pay $94,500 per day, or $70 million over two years, with 10% of this sum going to an unknown shareholder. It remains unclear whether this shareholder is a government official, an Albanian citizen, or a foreign entity. Regardless, it is now up to SPAK (the Special Anti-Corruption Structure) to investigate and uncover the true beneficiary of these millions of taxpayer dollars. To date, the known partners have invested $50 million in an asset purchased for $15 million, with all the funds funneled back to Renco S.p.a. for installing vessels that continue to absorb tens of millions of euros from the state budget without producing a single kilowatt-hour of energy.

https://www.syri.net/plug/766406/ortaku-i-fshehte-i-tigrave-te-beles-dhe-nafta-nga-kompanite-e-lidhura-me-garden-revolucionare-te-iranit/